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Splinters of Being 




The supreme pleasure in literature is to realise the non-existent. 
Oscar Wilde, The Artist as Critic 
 
―We‘re splinters & mosaics; not, as they used to hold, immaculate, monolithic, consistent 
wholes,‖ wrote Virginia Woolf in her diary.[1] We should pause over the two terms neatly joined 
by Woolf‘s ampersand, for they suggest different, perhaps antithetical, ways of thinking about the 
self. A mosaic, after all, is precisely an arrangement of ―splinters,‖ an assembly of fragments into 
a new totality or consistency. Today we might see in that difference an index of contrasting 
aspects of Woolf‘s own writing-identity: stylistic innovation on the one hand, personal 
fragmentation on the other. But Woolf‘s sense, at least in her diary note, of the difference 
between an outdated ―whole‖ self and a modern fragmentary one is not an anxious but an 
enthusiastic, almost jubilant one. The demise of the ―monolithic‖ Victorian ego was, in her eyes, 
something to be celebrated, for it corresponded to a liberation from the ―ill-fitting vestments‖ of 
nineteenth-century prose, with its conventional structures of plot, character, and ―plausibility‖ 
tailor-made to constrict or misrepresent reality and falsify the ―myriad impressions‖ of the human 
psyche.[2] For Woolf this aesthetic liberation was, moreover, not simply a matter of literary style. 
It encompassed a whole new contact with life, beyond the ―tyrant‖ self (an echo there, perhaps, of 
Freud on ―his majesty the ego‖), a tyrant that had for so long ruled over social interaction and 
reduced the existence of the Other to a prescriptive narrative of the Same.  
          Fernando Pessoa would certainly have agreed with these remarks by Woolf about the 
demise, in the modern age, of a unitary self that had once thought itself ―immaculate, monolithic, 
consistent.‖ ―Vivem em nós inúmeros‖ (A multitude lives in us), he famously wrote, making sure 
to double his point by signing the text em outra pessoa: with the name of Ricardo Reis. The latter 
―person‖ was one of Pessoa‘s ―heteronyms‖—not, that is, as he insisted, a mere pseudonym 
concealing an essentially intact authorial ego, but the name of a full-fledged alternative identity, 
with a consistent biography entirely distinct from Pessoa‘s ―own‖ (thus, according to Pessoa, 
Ricardo Reis was born a year before Pessoa in 1887 and did quite different things than he had 
done: studied classics, supported the monarchy, emigrated to Brazil in 1919, and so on).  
          One of the first apparent ironies of Pessoa‘s work noted by critics turns on how the ―proper 
name‖ of the poet might be thought to signify the impropriety of his poetic identity, the 
impossibility of him ever writing, as it were, in propria persona. In Portuguese, that is, pessoa 
means both ―person‖ and ―persona‖ or ―mask,‖ so that the pessoas diversas of the Pessoan 
texts—the three most important being named Alberto Caeiro, Álvaro de Campos, and Ricardo 
Reis—could signify ―various people,‖ ―various masks,‖ or just ―various Pessoas.‖ We see 
Pessoa—a term we must now read in all of these senses—playing on the semiotic undecidability 
of name or noun in a stanza that recalls Woolf‘s figure of ―splinters & mosaics‖:  
 
             E como são estilhaços  
             Do ser, as coisas dispersas 
             Quebro a alma em pedaços  
             E em pessoas diversas.[3]  
 
                       [Just as things dispersed 
             Are splinters of being 
             I break my soul in bits 
             And into various persons.] 
 
Being Pessoa, then, means being more than one pessoa, not just in theory but in the flesh, in the 
fundamental tissue of the ego‘s selfaffective identity: ―Multipliquei-me para me sentir‖ (I 
multiplied myself so as to feel myself), as the heteronym Álvaro de Campos confesses.[4 ] What is 
crucial here is the last word, sentir: the fragmentation of the self, that is, corresponds not to an 
eclipse of selfhood, but on the contrary—and in a seeming paradox—it allows the subject to feel 
himself, to experience an affective self-identity. 
          Alain Badiou has written of the event of Pessoa as a philosophical scandal, an 
unprecedented and still traumatic break with conventional structures of thinking and being.[5] If 
the Pessoan self can only feel itself through the affect of the other, it is clear that thought (or at 
least Western, logocentric thought) can only struggle, in the face of it, to avoid breakdown: the 
very principle of noncontradiction on which philosophical logic is founded is flouted, it seems, by 
Pessoa. Earlier modernist declarations of an apparently similar kind—such as Rimbaud‘s famous 
Je est un autre—had not troubled philosophy nearly so much, for the ―alienation‖ in question 
could always be understood, according to a quite literal reading, as a direct function of the 
―otherness‖ of language, of a preexisting and soulless symbolic order. But as soon as being 
assumes the status of bodily affect, as soon as it becomes phenomenal, the poetic statement 
begins to look more philosophically precarious, harder to represent: ―I feel myself/another.‖ 
When Campos writes ―Multipliquei-me para me sentir,‖ the chiasmic symmetry of the line 
merely masks—as pessoa—its nonsensical kernel: ―I multiply myself to feel my singularity.‖ We 
confront an unthinkable coincidentia oppositorum, what Badiou calls a ―multiple singularity.‖ 
The Pessoan universe is real, writes Badiou, and as such is ―at once multiple, contingent and non-
totalizable‖ (PM, 73). 
          For Woolf, as we saw, the demise of a ―monolithic‖ identity opened up new creative 
possibilities for contact with life, with an affective otherness whose vibrancy and immediacy is 
no longer diminished or falsified by the habitual semantic demands of the (Victorian) ego. There 
are comparable moments of exultation in Pessoa: ―Abram-me todas as portas!‖ (Open all the 
doors!) yells Campos in ―Salutation to Walt Whitman,‖ where the exuberance and stylistic 
freedom of Whitman‘s verse is embraced, identified with, as both sign and method of ―fierce and 
tender brotherhood with all things.‖[6] But in a late poem, entitled ―Senhor Silva,‖ and signed 
Fernando Pessoa (it is dated March 28, 1934, although like most of his work it was not published 
in his lifetime), we are given a vivid picture of how an encounter with the other as estilhaço do 
ser (splinter of being) can also be devastating, can pierce through the fictive social integument 
that seals and preserves the ego‘s reality: 
             
            The barber‘s son passed away, 
            A child of just five years. 
            I know his father—for a year now 
            We‘ve talked as he shaves my beard. 
 
            When he told me the news, as much 
            Heart as I have gave a shudder; 
            All flustered, I hugged him, 
            And he wept on my shoulder. 
 
            In this calm and stupid life, 
            I never know how I should act. 
            But, my God, I feel human pain! 
            Don‘t ever deny me that! (EU, 328) 
 
 
Here the other‘s being is suddenly felt, not as a discursive effect, but as a razor—a sharp edge 
that punctures the ego‘s emotional defenses and exposes its triviality, its inability to really know 
anything more than empty chitchat. What is crucial, what is genuinely Pessoan here, is the way 
that the poetic opening to the other, to the pain of the other‘s being, is immediately doubled by a 
selfreflection, by a strained avowal on the part of the ‗I‘ that its own affective dimension—
perhaps indeed its very ontological status—is wholly invested in, and may be nothing apart from, 
the contingent encounter with an other‘s being. The ―unpoetic‖ tone of the poem, its awkward, 
flustered voice, especially at the end—where the ego, momentarily eclipsed by the other‘s pain, 
seems to return with all its self-regarding verbosity—this poetic embarrassment should be seen as 
a revealing symptom: suddenly the Pessoan ego is exposed, caught off-guard, in a kind of ethical 
desperation. If the ego‘s relation to the other also constitutes its ontological coming-to-self, we 
can see how in this poem, in this poetic encounter with the barber‘s grief, the question of the 
ethics of the poetic act imposes itself. The aesthetic purity or sanctity of the exchange between 
the two men, as the discursive structure of ―transference‖ between the barber and his customer 
collapses onto an unspeakable real, leaves the poetic ‗I‘ stranded before the stark reality of its 
object. The rhetorical bluster of ―my God, I feel human pain‖ cannot disguise this poetic ego‘s 
morbid appetite for the other‘s jouissance. It only lacks the nerve to declare, like Sylvia Plath‘s 
Lady Lazarus, ―I eat men like air.‖[7] 
          The matter of the other, then, in Pessoa, is always at the same time a matter of the ‗I.‘ This 
is no mere playful masquerade, however, but a complex imbrication, sometimes an agonized 
struggle. The encounter with the other‘s being, as seen in the barbershop, is potentially both 
inspirational and flatulent: Its anguish produces the poet‘s ecstatic song but also his empty 
rhetoric, the mere hot air of an egoistic defense. Now the signature ―Fernando Pessoa,‖ unlike 
perhaps less self-conscious heteronyms such as Caeiro and Campos, seems to bear the burden of 
this self-conflicted reflection on the fictive ego‘s ambiguous relation to an ―authentic‖ being. The 
clearest statement of this comes in a poem again signed by Pessoa with his own name and dated 
(no doubt with a touch of self-mockery) April 1, 1931; it bears the title Autopsicografia:  
  
            O poeta é um fingidor. 
            Finge tão completamente 
            Que chega a fingir que é dor 
            A dor que deveras sente. 
 
            E os que lêem o que escreve, 
            Na dor lida sentem bem, 
            Não as duas que ele teve, 
            Mas só a que eles não têm. 
 
            E assim nas calhas de roda 
            Gira, a entreter a razão, 
            Esse comboio de corda 
            Que se chama o coração. (OP, 237) 
 
            [The poet is a faker. 
            Who‘s so good at his act 
            He even fakes the pain 
            Of pain he feels in fact. 
 
            And those who read his words 
            Will feel in his writing 
            Neither of the pains he has 
            But just the one they‘re missing. 
 
            And so around its track 
            this thing called the heart winds, 
            A little clockwork train 
            To entertain our minds.] (EU, 314) 
We can read in this poem‘s ―self-soul-writing‖ (to gloss its Greek title) a diagnostic self-critique 
of the future encounter with the barber‘s inconsolable grief. There, what was momentarily felt for 
real, deveras—the unspeakable pain of the other—was immediately ―faked‖ by the rhetorical 
flourish of the ego, the attempt to appropriate the being, the otherness before it as a token of 
poetic self-authenticity. The real thus becomes, in the terms of Autopsicografia, mere mental 
entertainment; it is robbed of its pathological or precious singularity, made part of the comboio de 
corda, the mere play or circulation of signifiers.  
          The complexity of Pessoa‘s poetic self-othering begins to become apparent, then, when we 
read between these two texts. If the self can only feel ―itself‖ by multiplying itself through and as 
another— and we should not forget that this Iago-like self-declaration is made precisely em outra 
pessoa, by ―Álvaro de Campos‖—if this is so, then the constitutive poetic encounter with 
otherness becomes an unthinkable paradox. On the one hand, none of the series of Pessoan selves 
will ever be able to do more than ―fake‖ (fingir): the poetic act, in other words, will always be 
precisely that—an act, a recitation or forgery of ―being.‖ At the same time, however, the pessoa 
forged in the poem is precisely not an ironic mask knowingly at odds with its act of fakery, but 
remains at one with the affect—a dor que deveras sente—completely submerged in his (the 
other‘s) pain. The poet, in other words, fakes the real. Or, to put it the other way round, he feels 
as authentically singular what he simultaneously knows to be determined by the iterative 
replicability of the signifier.  
          The Pessoan writing-self, then, is a kind of embodied paradox, at once acutely conscious of 
its own textuality and obliviously caught up in the passion of the encounter with the other. The 
multiple singularity of Pessoa, to recall Badiou‘s precise formula, corresponds to a perplexing 
logic of ―neither . . . nor‖: Pessoa is neither authentic nor ironic, neither earnest nor playful, 
neither Whitman nor Wilde (and, as we will see, in a sense neither Portuguese nor British). We 
can best explore this paradoxical logic by pausing over the topic of poetic vocation in Pessoa—
or, to put it more literally, that of the Pessoan voice. The old Bloomian theme of the ―anxiety of 
influence‖ is often invoked to make sense of a text drafted in 1916 where Pessoa in effect 
rewrites one of Wordsworth‘s poems, ―The Solitary Reaper‖ (1805).[8] But what such a reading 
risks failing to account for is the radical difference between the kinds of ―vocation,‖ of 
constitutive poetic callings, figured by each poem. At the end of Wordsworth‘s poem, the poet 
pauses to listen to the song of a ―solitary highland lass‖ at work in the field: 
 
            Will no one tell me what she sings?— 
            Perhaps the plaintive numbers glow 
            For old, unhappy, far-off things, 
            And battles long ago; 
            Or is it some more humble lay, 
            Familiar matter of to-day? 
            Some natural sorrow, loss, or pain, 
            That has been, and may be again? 
            What e‘er the theme, the maiden sang 
            As if her song could have no ending; 
            I saw her singing at her work, 
            And o‘er the sickle bending;— 
            I listened, motionless and still; 
            And, as I mounted up the hill 
            The music in my heart I bore, 
            Long after it was heard no more.[9] 
 
 
The poet‘s questions about the content of the song are placid rhetorical tropes, entirely lacking 
the urgency supposedly implied by the interrogative punctuation. The point is, and the next stanza 
admits as much, it doesn’t matter what she‘s singing about, for it is precisely the formal self-
enclosure of the song, its infinite aesthetic oneness-with-self, that makes it the perfect figure for 
Romantic truth (a truth whose semblance of authenticity would only be jeopardized, in fact, by 
any specific content, as a phrase like ―familiar matter of to-day,‖ with its touch of discordant 
bathos, half suggests). And the circular formal perfection of the voice, visually echoed by the 
woman‘s body bending over the curved blade, is also Wordsworth‘s master-trope for self, for a 
oneness of being that underwrites the faultless syntax of identification that wraps up the poem, as 
its ―truth‖ passes from voice to monolithic listener to spiritualized essence. Now let‘s see what 
happens to this calm scene when it gets recast in Pessoa‘s imagination:  
 
            Ah, canta, canta sem razão! 
            O que em mim sente ‗stá pensando. 
            Derrama no meu coração 
            A tua incerta voz ondeando! 
 
            Ah, poder ser tu, sendo eu! 
            Ter a tua alegre inconsciência, 
            E a consciência disso! Ó céu! 
            Ó campo! Ó canção! A ciência 
 
            Pesa tanto e a vida é tão breve! 
            Entrai por mim dentro! Tornai 
            Minha alma a vossa sombra leve! 
            Depois, levando-me, passai! (OP 111) 
 
            [Oh sing, sing without reason! 
            What in me feels is thinking. 
            Into my heart pour 
            Flooding your uncertain voice! 
            Oh, to be able to be you, being me! 
            To have your joyous unconsciousness, 
            And the consciousness of it! O heaven! 
            O countryside! O song! Knowledge 
            Weighs so heavy and life is so short! 
            Enter me, inside! Turn 
            My soul to your light shadow! 
            Then, bearing me away, pass on!] 
 
 
It is as if what remains unsignified or unconscious in Wordsworth‘s text comes back to disfigure 
the Pessoan sense and its syntax: the steady rhythm of semi-colons is replaced by a spasmodic 
frenzy of exclamatory punctuation. In Pessoa, it is the strangeness of the voice, not its natural 
perfection, that seizes, convulses the poet. Because it sings sem razão, without being caught up in 
the ostensibly consistent meaningfulness of the psyche, the voice emerges as radically unknown, 
incerta, impossible to respond to or make sense of.  
          What is crucial not to miss in the transition from Wordsworth to Pessoa is the new 
preoccupation with consciousness, with the phenomenal surface of affect, which displaces the 
spiritualizing metaphors of the Romantic. And Pessoan consciousness is not one, being not at one 
with what Wordsworth would have called ―spontaneous feelings‖: ―O que em mim sente ‘stá 
pensando‖ (what feels in me is thinking) provides a neat mock-Cartesian formula, the human 
heart as res cogitans, for what Lacan will see as the divided subject of the unconscious. But the 
Pessoan cogito is, precisely, conscious. It feels its split from spontaneity, just as it actively thinks 
its non-self-identity. It is as if the topographical difference between the unconscious and the ego 
has disappeared: the subject is neither a sliding signifier nor an imaginary fixation, but 
somewhere in between. 
          As we might expect, such a subject plays havoc with the economy of identification that 
once governed the production of Romantic truth, as seen in Wordsworth‘s poem. Instead of an 
ego introjecting the voice of the other‘s being as a guarantee of eternal truthfulness—―The music 
in my heart I bore / Long after it was heard no more‖—we have one dizzily aware of its own in-
betweenness, of its impossible wish to feel itself both self and other: ―Ter a tua alegre 
inconsciência, / E a consciência disso!” (To have your joyous unconsciousness, / And yet to be 
conscious of it!). This last line reveals the true Gothic dimension of the poetic self here: Like 
Poe‘s Hans Pfaal, with his wish ―to leave the world, yet continue to exist,‖ Pessoa occupies a 
perilous border between inner and outer, ecstatic being and tortured consciousness.[10] 
          When the poet is summoned by the voice of the other‘s being, then, in Pessoa this 
corresponds not to an imaginary validation of the poetic ‗I,‘ but to its ecstatic fragmentation. On 
the one hand, this entails an incisive critique of a Romantic ideology centered on a blithely 
appropriative ego, a self for which nature is no more than a Platonic mirror, an idealized self-
reflection. The Pessoan transformation of ―The Solitary Reaper‖ indeed brings to the surface of 
textual consciousness the Gothic double of such a Romantic self, through its avowal of an 
impossible desire for metempsychotic selfabandonment: ―Ah, poder ser tu, sendo eu!” (Ah, to be 
able to be you, all the while still being myself!). It is here that we can return to the question of the 
ludicrous or laughable in Pessoa: for it is the very openness of the avowal, the wide-eyed 
innocence with which it voices its impossible wish for unity-in-difference, that serves to ironize 
the poetic utterance, to open up a gap between it (as pessoa, persona or mask) and a more 
serious—or else more deluded— poetic self, the kind that could imagine itself at one with the 
music of the other‘s being. 
          But at the same time, alongside this Gothic-comic exposé of the Romantic self, we can also 
discern the seeds of a more modern and much less discriminating critique (if ―critique,‖ with its 
Enlightenment implications, is still the word): namely the rejection— above all legible in the 
percussive force of Pessoa‘s exclamatory syntax, with its implied sense of sudden astonishment, 
of novelty— of the implicit ―rationality‖ of reality itself. 
          Such a rejection was being announced early in the twentieth century under the polemical 
banner of futurism. One of several bad political choices made by Pessoa, as we can note with 
retrospective wisdom, was his flirtation with Marinetti‘s ideas. This especially characterized the 
period, during the First World War, when Pessoa was a central figure in the group of Lisbon 
writers and artists around the journals Orpheu (1915) and Portugal Futurista (1917). In 1914 a 
friend had brought him back from Paris a copy of the Futurist Manifesto, that exclamatory 
diatribe in which Marinetti diagnoses the ills of European civilization—chiefly what he called the 
―stinking gangrene‖ of its defunct knowledge and culture— and proposes some original 
solutions: burning down the libraries, flooding the museums, bombing Florence, etc.[11] 
          With futurism, the jouissance of a modernist aesthetic rebellion against bourgeois existence 
reaches its most flagrant, most insolent form—and the effect, at least at first, could be extremely 
funny. When Marinetti informed a lecture audience in London that they belonged to ―a nation of 
sycophants and snobs, enslaved by old worm-eaten traditions, social conventions, and 
romanticism,‖ they ―rewarded him with their laughter and applause,‖ as a newspaper drolly 
reported the next day.[12] It was the superficially amusing— although in the end very disturbing—
irrationality of such a response that provoked the journalistic irony. What was troubling about 
futurism was the not-so-hilarious possibility Marinetti‘s rhetoric seemed to imply: the slippage 
from aesthetic posturing to political action, violent action. As Raymond Williams puts it,  
 
           an emphasis on the creativity of the pre-rational could be coopted into a rejection of all  
            forms of would-be rational politics. . . to the point where, in one version, the politics of action,    
           of the unreflecting strong, could be idealized as necessarily liberating.[13]  
 
 
Thus the list of futurist demands would include, alongside a new set of dynamic artists, a new set 
of strong generals like Mussolini.  
          Pessoa‘s literary response to futurism was thus caught up in an ambiguous rhetoric of 
aesthetic and political radicalism. The fragmentation of the Romantic self that we saw at work in 
Pessoa‘s rewriting of Wordsworth already entailed, we have suggested, a  ―futurist‖ potential in 
its implicit rejection of a ―rational,‖ egocentered view of the world. At the very point where the 
poetic persona ironically voices the self-undoing, nonsensical logic of its own heteronymy—―to 
have your joyous unconsciousness, and yet to be conscious of it!‖—reality itself starts to 
disintegrate, as if the poem can no longer successfully grasp or articulate its elements, but only 
name them with astonishment, as objects lying spilled before it: ―Ó céu! Ó campo! Ó canção!‖ 
(O heavens! O landscape! O song!). These three terms could be seen as the basic elements of the 
Romantic lyric, except of course that in Romanticism the third of these—the poetic voice—is 
precisely what links heaven and earth, makes the spiritual and the material into a meaningful 
whole. In Pessoa, by contrast, the poetic voice can never be reduced to the government of an ego. 
In Ela canta, pobre ceifeira the song is not only dissociated from the consciousness of the reaper-
singer but can also neither be reaped nor successfully grasped as the property of the poet‘s ―I.‖ 
What emerges from the self-undoing of the Romantic poet-subject is a sense of the astonishing 
singularity of the things—sky, earth or voice—that can no longer be made to signify, as they 
once supposedly did, ―rationally‖: Ah, canta, canta sem razão! 
          The rhetorical force of Pessoan exclamation, then, while initially close to the lyrical 
outburst of the Romantic apostrophe, is given new impetus by Marinetti‘s hyperbolic futurist 
aesthetic, which Pessoa discovered just as the First World War was beginning. The aim of a 
futurist artwork, according to Marinetti‘s distinctly untimely rhetoric, was to be an ―intellectual 
bomb,‖ to shatter the complacent self-certainty of bourgeois existence (IF, 250). Such an 
ambition was to some extent, of course, one shared by most forms of literary modernism, and 
Marinetti‘s invocation of technological modernity as heralding a new aesthetic of instant global 
communication—―a great daily paper is the synthesis of one whole day in the world,‖ as he put 
it—is an eminently modernist trope (IF, 247). Joyce was to put the same idea to work in Ulysses, 
where the narrative of the ―Aeolus‖ episode is divided up by newspaper-style headlines, allowing 
the text to stage a series of playful, ironic semiotic collisions and slippages. Likewise, the 
Pessoan text Ultimatum, published in 1917 under the name of Álvaro de Campos in the one and 
only issue of Portugal Futurista, begins by seeming to mimic the discourse of the 
newspaperman: ―Mandado de despejo aos mandarins da Europa! Fora!‖ (Eviction notice to the 
mandarins of Europe! Get out!). 
          The question of the politics of Pessoan heteronymy is inevitably raised by an attempt to 
read Ultimatum. If the text can be seen, as Irene Ramalhos Santos sees it, ―as a futurist poem 
which puts in question the very notion of poetry,‖ as such it must be understood precisely as a 
literary response to the political realities of the world during the First World War.[14] Pessoa 
himself, writing in English in the preface to a translation that he never actually wrote, draws 
attention to the text‘s historical situatedness: ―My reason for translating the Ultimatum is that it is 
quite the cleverest piece of literature called into being by the Great War.‖[15]  But this derivation 
is already something of a paradox. The text is ―called into being‖—and we recall the 
irrecuperable poetic voice or vocation in the 1916 Ela canta, pobre ceifeira—by an event that 
corresponds to the annihilation of a European culture that could still express itself ―poetically,‖ in 
which a poetic voice could still constitute a significant intervention. To this extent, in the view of 
a Marinetti, the war was the perfect subject for a futurist art: That is, an art dogmatically 
committed to smashing the apparatus of Romantic selfhood, with its delusory metaphors of 
organic integrity and natural connectivity. Pessoa‘s title Ultimatum could thus signify what is 
―ultimate,‖ what exceeds any ―traditional‖ artistic statement, indeed what flatly rejects the whole 
notion of artistic ―content,‖ with its embedded Romantic conception of art as communicative. In 
this sense, the paradox redoubles itself: Just as Ultimatum may be considered a futurist poem that 
puts poetry itself in question, the war constitutes, in this futurist perspective, a historical context 
that puts in question the very meaningfulness of historical context. 
          It is here that we can see, again, how the ―multiple singularity‖ of Pessoa prevents us from 
identifying his work, either generically or politically, in any straightforward sense. Firstly, the 
contexts of the war and its futurist aestheticization provide no more than a smokescreen for 
Ultimatum, whose title should rather be understood as alluding to—according to Santos, indeed, 
taking revenge for—the national humiliation of the Portuguese caused by the so-called British 
Ultimatum of 1890. That year had marked a significant development in the ―scramble for Africa,‖ 
the conflict of European imperial powers over the control of southern Africa. The British 
demanded that the Portuguese, their old colonial allies, vacate the territory between Angola and 
Mozambique, in effect signaling the end of Portugal‘s imperial dominion (AP, 132).  
          Ultimatum, then, appears split between irreconcilable contexts: on one side the specific 
political history of Portuguese and wider European colonialism; on the other, the world-
obliterating jouissance of futurism, with its universal aestheticization of a violence that leaves no 
room for specific national or individual histories. If our reading of the text sets out to be 
historicist, we would need to pay special attention to Pessoa‘s biographical dividedness regarding 
the significance of the 1890 ―British Ultimatum.‖ Having been transplanted to a British colony 
only seven years after that momentous date, the young Pessoa was educated in, and strongly 
identified with, an Anglophone culture that used literature as a fitting representation of its global 
supremacy. If the adult Pessoa‘s persistent Anglophilia and his dogged attempts to write poetry in 
English testify to the durability of this early interpellation by British culture, something of his 
ideological ambivalence can be read in his later remarks about the supreme literary embodiment 
of that culture: namely, as Pessoa put it, ―the monstrous phenomenon called Shakespeare‖ (SP, 
215). Writing in English, as if to make the point as a knowing insider, Pessoa made a claim for 
which his teachers in Durban might have put him in detention: ―The plays and poems of 
Shakespeare are, from the pure artistic standpoint, the greatest failure that the world has ever 
looked on‖ (215). 
          It is just this kind of carnivalesque inversion—the first shall be last, the greatest success the 
greatest failure—that characterizes the explosive invective of Pessoa‘s Ultimatum. It may not 
have been, as Pessoa had claimed in the preface to his unwritten English translation, ―the 
cleverest piece of literature called into being by the Great War‖—there is, after all, some 
formidable competition for that title: Ulysses, The Waste Land, À la recherche du temps perdu—
but it was probably the most insulting and may have been the funniest. In its opening section, the 
text presents itself as a kind of rhetorical exercise in insolence, a supreme catalogue of abuse 
aimed at the ―mandarins,‖ the cultural and political masters of the world, who are repeatedly 
ordered: ―Fora‖ (Get out). At first the insults seem chiefly directed at the imperial rivals of 
Portugal—at the British (―merchantman Kipling, you poetry pragmatist and junk heap 
imperialist‖) or the French (―Maurice Barrès, you feminist of Action‖) (SP, 72)—and might be 
considered merely the outpourings of a frustrated Portuguese nationalist. But it quickly becomes 
clear that not only is ―two-bit Portugal‖ (74) also a target for the Pessoan invective, but indeed 
that it is, as the ―translator‘s preface‖ puts it, ―anti-everything‖ (70). 
          For Bakhtin, it was the grotesque carnivalesque body that best exemplified this utter lack of 
any specific ―aim,‖ this radical nonteleology: ―It is not a closed, completed unit; it is unfinished, 
outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits.‖16 What we could term the gothic-futurist aspect of 
Ultimatum corresponds to the grotesque form of its textuality—its discourse, syntax, and 
punctuation—that eclipses any semantic content, making it, in the end, less a political statement 
than a textual carnival in which the language of politics becomes mere material for the jouissance 
of an utterance: distorted, fragmented, made monstrous by it. What starts out as a polemical 
diatribe thus constantly borders on, and often collapses into, sheer nonsense: ―Lixo-guerreiro 
palavroso! Esterco Joffre-Hindenburguesco! Sentina europeia de Os Mesmos em scisão balofa!‖ 
[Wordy-warlike trash! Joffre-Hindenburgesque manure! European latrine of The Same in puffed-
up scission!‖] (AP, 134). We are not far, indeed, from Finnegans Wake here; and the scatological 
carnival of Ultimatum reaches its summa (or its nadir) in the enormous MERDA! that separates 
the two halves of the text. The outrageous impropriety of the utterance is doubled at the level of 
form, as the enormous letters breach the typographical conventions of the literary text, intruding 
on its polite paper-space with the vulgarity of a tabloid headline. 
          It is here that we should return to the question of how to read Pessoan heteronymy. 
Ultimatum is signed by Álvaro de Campos, which immediately differentiates it in some sense 
from Pessoa‘s ―orthonymic‖ texts (those, that is, signed Fernando Pessoa, such as Ela canta, 
pobre ceifeira and Autopsicografia). But how are we to interpret that difference? For Richard 
Zenith, the heteronymic signature of Ultimatum functions as an ironic frame around its 
scandalous content. Regarding the second part of the text, with its manifesto-like list of 
proclamations and demands, Zenith writes: ―Some critics have taken the diagnoses and 
prescriptions at face value, as if the author were being dead serious, and if ―author‖ means Álvaro 
de Campos, then fair enough, but Pessoa surely saw it as a satire of Nietzscheanism, of social 
engineering, and of his own pretensions to be fifteen or twenty writers in one‖ (SP, 71). The ad 
hominem rhetoric Zenith uses here—―fair enough,‖ ―but . . . surely‖—points to the key problem 
of the supposed link between heteronymy and irony: Such a link cannot be demonstrated by 
argument, so it must be asserted, as if a sufficiently vigorous assertion could restore the 
commonsense notion of an author being, not dead, but ―dead serious,‖ at one with his utterance. 
          The link between irony and literary persona implies, at some level, a distinction between 
authorized and non-authorized discourse, if not always as clear as the difference, say, between an 
Elizabeth Bennett and a Mr. Collins. As we have seen, though, it is impossible to locate any such 
distinction in Pessoan writing: The ceaseless multiplication of signatures is precisely not the work 
of an ironic Über-ich, wittily manipulating the various masks like a secret puppeteer. Instead with 
Pessoan heteronymy we encounter the paradoxical conjunction of, on one side, a non-ironic 
(―naïve‖) affective investment in each poetic identity as a singular being and, on the other, an 
insight into the fictionalizing effect of poetic invention, its iterative symbolic act annihilating the 
very singularity that called it into being.  
          Perhaps, lastly, the sense of the futurist context of Ultimatum can be clarified in this 
perspective. For while the histrionic invective staged in that text, with its vast grotesque catalogue 
of insults, might seem to make it nothing but a carnivalesque hoax, a poetic Punch and Judy 
show, we would be wrong to dismiss as ironic or non-authorized its scathing and agonized 
references to the British annexation of what remained of the Portuguese empire. For this 
bilingual, bicultural subject, neither properly Anglophone nor fully Portuguese, the irrational 
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